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The productivity slowdown in Europe since the mid-1990s is a reason for concern. Labour 
market rigidity, hampering innovation, may be a cause of the slowdown. In the paper this 
argument is placed in a broader perspective. Labour force participation is an important factor 
in explaining differences in productivity and welfare over time and across regions as can be 
illustrated by comparing the US and the EU-15. Moreover, technological change is not 
entirely exogenous. Dynamic increasing returns as introduced by Kaldor and Verdoorn may 
boost productivity. For countries other than the US catching up appears to be of importance. 
The question is then to what extent labour market institutions account for productivity growth. 
Regression analysis on a panel of 21 OECD countries covering the period 1960-2005 
reveals that employment protection is relevant but that the impact is qualitatively different 
before and after 1980. The reason is that in the first sub-period technological change is 
driven in most countries by imitation, whereas in the second sub-period innovation becomes 
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1. Introduction  
 
From 1995 at least up to 2004 productivity growth in Europe has been slower than in the US. 
Sometimes it is argued that the better achievement of the US in this period is due to frictions 
in the European labour markets as a result of rigid institutions (e.g. Alesina and Giavazzi, 
2006). However, Europe did well before 1995 in terms of productivity growth despite existing 
institutions in the labour market. Several questions arise. What has changed in the recent 
past? Are institutions important in explaining productivity growth? What role is played by the 
differences in labour force participation?  
 
To answer these questions we take a long-run perspective by analyzing growth and 
development over the period 1960-2005. In Section 2 economic growth in the EU-15 and in 
the US are compared. In a descriptive analysis productivity growth and its interaction with 
labour force participation appears to be of great importance.  
 
Section 3 is devoted to an empirical analysis of labour market institutions in explaining 
productivity growth in a sample of 21 OECD countries covering the period 1960-2005. 
Institutions are constraints that influence growth. According to Helpman (2004, p. 139): 
“Institutions are more fundamental determinants of economic growth than R&D or capital 
accumulation, human or physical. Yet economic studies of the impact of institutions on 
economic growth are very recent, despite the fact that economic historians and other social 
scientists have examined institutions for a long time.” This holds mutatis mutandis for the 
study of institutions that have been considered separately in the labour-market literature on 
the European unemployment problem. 
 
Productivity growth is driven by technological change, which to a large extent is context 
specific and dependent on history (cf. David, 2000, Lipsey, Carlaw, and Bekar, 2005). In 
addition, some endogenous factors may be taken into account. Verdoorn‟s law may be such 
an engine of growth (Verdoorn, 1949). In the past several authors emphasized the role 
played by this law (e.g. Cornwall, 1977, Scott, 1989, León-Ledesma, 2002). Another 
phenomenon that deserves attention is the possibility of catching-up. Countries that are not 
on the technology frontier may grow faster by imitating the technological leader, which is the 
US economy. We find that catching-up provides a more promising engine of growth than the 
time-honoured Verdoorn‟s law. It should be noted that our approach differs from the static 
and short-run analysis of Dew-Becker and Gordon (2008), who focus on the correlation 
between growth in labour productivity and employment per capita year by year.   4 
2. Productivity and welfare growth in Europe and the US 
 
The economic history of the US differs in a remarkable way from that of Europe. Two 
fundamental forces, i.e., output per hour and hours per capita are driving the development. 
This is illustrated by Figure 1, depicting output per hour (labour productivity), hours per capita 
(participation rate), and output per capita (material welfare) in the EU-15 relative to the US 
over the period 1960-2005. The data are from The Conference Board (2008). In 1960 
European labour productivity was lower than in the US. Thereafter there was a gradual 
increase in relative productivity that ended around 1995. In contrast, in 1960, labour force 
participation in Europe was substantially higher than in the US. In the course of time the 
relative participation rate shows a gradual decline that came to a halt around 1995. In the 
mid-1970s labour force participation in Europe became lower than that in the US, and in the 
1990s relative positions have completely turned around as compared with the 1960s.  
 
Figure 1 Output per hour (Y/H), hours per capita (H/N), and output per capita (Y/N) in the 
EU-15 relative to the US, 1960-2005. 
 
 
The implications of these developments for material welfare are straightforward. A relative 
increase in labour productivity raises welfare in Europe vis-à-vis the US. A relative decline in 
labour participation has the opposite effect. On balance output per capita increased in 
Europe vis-à-vis the US until the mid-seventies, and remained more or less constant 
afterwards.         5 
 
Table 1 Output per hour (Y/H), hours per capita (H/N), and output per capita (Y/N) in the 
EU-15 and US (yearly percentage changes)* 
                           EU-15                         US 
Period  Y/H  H/N  Y/N  Y/H  H/N  Y/N 
             
1960-1965  5.3  -1.1  4.2  3.2   0.3  3.5 
1965-1970  5.4  -1.5  3.9  2.0   0.3  2.3 
1970-1975  4.0  -1.5  2.5  2.1  -0.5  1.6 
1975-1980  3.5  -0.7  2.8  1.1   1.6  2.7 
1980-1985  2.7  -1.4  1.3  1.6   0.6  2.2 
1985-1990  2.2   0.8  3.0  1.3   1.0  2.3 
1990-1995  2.3  -1.3  1.0  1.2   0  1.2 
1995-2000  1.7   0.9  2.6  2.2   1.8  3.0 
2000-2005  1.1   0.1  1.2  2.4  -1.0  1.4 
             
* Source: The Conference Board (2008). Data are described in the Appendix. 
 
These developments are elucidated by the figures presented in Table 1, showing the growth 
rates of the variables in Figure 1 for the EU-15 and US separately. In order to trace 
accelerations and decelerations in the growth rates we consider 5-year averages. As can be 
seen, the EU-15 growth rate of output per hour shows a steady decline, whereas the 
development of the US growth rate of output per hour is U-shaped. After 1995, productivity 
growth in Europe fell behind that of the US, so that relative productivity decreased.   
 
The good performance of the US economy in terms of productivity growth in the period 1960-
1975 as compared to the period 1975-1995 is the result of efficient mass production inherited 
from the past (e.g. Nelson and Wright, 1992, Lazonick, 2009.) In the course of time, 
however, the possibilities of further improvements along these lines petered out (cf. Gordon, 
2004). This gave rise to a much discussed productivity slowdown that started in the mid-
1970s and that lasted until the mid-1990s (cf. Dertouzos, Lester, and Solow, 1989). As Glyn 
(2006, p. 14) observes: “The broadest explanation of productivity slowdown, which should 
apply particularly to the USA as leader country, was that the mass production system known 
as „Fordism‟ - assembly line production with workers performing repeated tasks - was 
reaching its limits.”    6 
 
It is remarkable that the recovery of US productivity growth took such a long time. The 
modern information and communication technologies (ICT) were already under way at least 
from the seventies onwards. But the introduction of a new general purpose technology takes 
time and may even lead to a productivity decline in the short run (e.g. Perez, 2002, Nahuis, 
2003, Lipsey, Carlaw, and Bekar, 2005, Gaffard, 2008). This explains to a certain extent the 
well-known statement of Solow (1987): “You can see the computer age everywhere but in 
the productivity statistics.” However, this is not the complete story. A major change in 
technology requires institutional adaptations in the form of deregulation and liberalisation 
(e.g. Lazonick, 2009). Insider protection and favourite positions for existing firms must be 
eliminated so that outsiders have access to the resources required for restructuring the 
economy. Deregulation and liberalization went full steam ahead in the 1970s with the 
election of Margaret Thatcher in the UK and in the 1980s with the election of Ronald Reagan 
in the US (cf. Akerlof and Shiller, 2009). 
 
The growth rate of output per capita in the US was not strongly affected by the productivity 
slowdown. Steady increases in the participation rate, i.e., hours per capita, contributed to the 
rise in material welfare. On the other hand, the increase of the participation rate may have 
depressed productivity growth to a certain extent as less productive workers entered into the 
labour force (cf. Dew-Becker and Gordon, 2006). 
 
The economic history of the European countries is quite different. The high growth rates of 
output per hour in the EU-15 in the 1960s and 1970s are the result of imitation in a situation 
with a large technology backlog. As illustrated by Figure 1 in the beginning of the 1960s the 
European productivity level vis-à-vis the US was about 50%, but in the mid-1990s the 
backlog of Europe in terms of output per hour has decreased to only 10 percentage points. 
The age of mass production in Europe proceeded quickly and efficiently at the time when the 
peak in the US had already been reached. Catching-up is a matter of exhausting 
possibilities, which is reflected in the gradual decline of relative productivity increases. 
Eventually, the process of catching-up stopped which induced pleas for institutional reform to 
make Europe look more like the US (e.g. Eichengreen, 2007).  
 
Hours per capita in Europe declined until 1985, but in the second half of the 1980s and after 
1995 the participation rate increased to a considerable extent. As a result the initial welfare 
backlog did not disappear completely, despite the long period of catching up in terms of 
output per hour. In 1960 the European level of material welfare vis-à-vis the US was 61%,   7 
and in 1970 it was 68%, but in 2005 the backlog of Europe in terms of output per capita was 
still 32 percentage points. 
 
Gordon (2008) sees this as a paradox and asks: “Why is Europe so productive yet so poor?” 
This raises the additional question whether welfare or labour productivity is an appropriate 
basis for comparison between countries. The answer depends on how one interprets 
Europe‟s shorter hours. Eichengreen (2007) distinguishes two sets of observers. The first 
set, what might be called the MIT-school, regards Europe‟s shorter hours as a matter of 
cultural preference. Europeans, in this view, simply enjoy their leisure more than their US 
counterparts. The second set, which might be called the Minnesota school, argues that 
Americans work more hours because lower taxes make doing so worthwhile. As observed by 
De Groot, et al. (2006) distortions in the choice between labour and leisure are the result of 
marginal tax rates in excess of average tax rates. However, according to Eichengreen 
neither taxes nor tastes can wholly explain the decline in hours worked
1. As a consequence 
both output per capita and leisure have to be taken into account to compare US performance 
with the state of affairs in the EU.  
 
Lower material welfare is not the only point that marks the distinction between Europe and 
the US. There are also important institutional differences especially in the labour market (cf. 
Layard, Nickell and Jackman, 2005). This raises the question if and to what extent 
institutions matter in explaining differences between countries in labour productivity growth. 
We turn to this question in the next section. 
                                                   
1 Another hypothesis, coordination externalities and low levels of labour mobility in Europe, is 
advanced by Alesina, Glaeser and Sacerdote (2005). The evidence for this hypothesis is indirect 
however.    8 
3. Labour-market institutions and labour productivity growth 
 
3.1 Measurement and theory 
 
The influence of institutions on labour productivity growth is analyzed by running regressions 
for a pool of 21 OECD countries. To eliminate short-run influences we again consider 5-year 
averages over the period 1960-2005, implying that the number of observations amounts to 
189. Averaging is usual practice in empirical growth literature (cf. Islam, 1995). As before, 
the data with respect to economic variables (productivity, hours per capita) are taken from 
the website of the Conference Board (2008). Indices for institutional variables are from Allard 
and Lindert (2006). These variables are described in the Appendix. As the availability of 
these time series for the period 1960-1980 is strongly limited we focus on the impact of 
employment protection (EPL), unemployment compensation and wage coordination.  
 
For these variables Allard and Lindert constructed long historical time series. The index of 
EPL dates back to 1950. According to the authors (2006, p. 8): “The new index reveals that 
job protection was neither fixed over time nor the same across countries. The view that strict 
EPL was already in place in the low-unemployment area before 1973 is incorrect except for 
Spain and Portugal, where firm EPL dates to the dictatorships of Franco and Salazar (but 
where democracy also brought greater job protection)”. The authors present a figure 
illustrating the differences in timing across countries since 1960 and remark that (2006, p. 8): 
“As with the dole, EPL rose at varying times and to different extents across countries; and 
strict EPL often antedated other institutional changes and poorer macro-performance by a 
few years. Italy was a leader, tightening protection for workers in formal sectors in the 1960s, 
three decades before it instituted generous unemployment benefits. France, Germany, and 
the Netherlands also tightened EPL in the years of union strength and full employment 
between 1967 and 1973. Other countries such as Sweden, the United Kingdom and Ireland 
built up their legal job defenses after the first oil shock hit. Since the mid-1980s EPL, like 
unemployment benefits, has hardly retreated for the OECD as a whole, and cross-country 
differences persist”.  
 
Productivity growth can be explained as a process of cumulative causation along the 
Verdoorn-Kaldor mechanism. This mechanism reflects the existence of dynamic economies 
of scale due to increased specialisation, embodied technological change and the existence 
of static increasing returns. The implication is that output growth, which is demand-driven, 
directly causes productivity growth. The relation is known as Verdoorn‟s law in honour of the   9 
author who initiated an extended discussion on cumulative causation (Verdoorn, 1949). In 
the recent literature on economic growth the law is largely ignored. Léon-Ledesma (2002, p. 
202) has a different opinion: “It will be shown that cumulative growth models, far from being 
old-fashioned, allow for the introduction of explicit technological progress variables and give 
a plausible explanation of the recent growth performance in developed countries”. The 
author extends this model by introducing catching-up as an additional cause of growth.  
 
In the present paper we will first take both engines of growth, the growth of output 
(Verdoorn‟s law) and the productivity backlog (catching up) separately into account. 
Thereafter we will elaborate on the combination of both engines of growth. In all cases our 
main objective is to investigate the additional impact of labour market institutions on 
productivity growth. It remains to be seen whether other explanatory variables should be 
taken into account. Here we only work with hours per capita and the investment-output ratio. 
Introduction of a human capital variable did not give a satisfactory result because the 
regression coefficients with respect to this variable appeared to be negative
2.    
 
3.2 Verdoorn‟s law and institutions 
 
According to Verdoorn‟s law labour productivity depends on cumulative production, because 
of learning and the ongoing implementation of economies of scale. As a result growth of 
labour productivity can statistically be explained by output growth. Several arguments have 
been brought against this view (e.g. Cornwall, 1977, pp. 127-128, Scott, 1989, pp. 336-348).  
Although the statistical problems surrounding the law are not solved in a completely 
satisfactory way, the theoretical ideas behind the relation remain attractive. 
 
(Insert Table 2 about here) 
 
In the first column of Table 2 Verdoorn„s law is estimated with the rate of investment (from 
the Penn World Tables) as an additional explanatory variable. In the empirical literature 
different measures for output growth are applied. Verdoorn‟s original publication confined 
attention to industry. Scott (1989) considers the whole of non-residential business. In the 
present paper output is defined as GDP. The coefficient for output growth is in line with the 
results in other studies. The rate of investment has a positive and significant impact on 
productivity growth. 
                                                   
2 The human capital variable is adults‟ average years of education from World Bank.    10 
 
As observed in Section 2, an increase in hours per capita reduces productivity growth 
because the extra hours are made by people with a relatively low productivity (cf. Dew-
Becker and Gordon, 2006). This effect can be captured by adding the growth rate of hours 
per capita as an additional explanatory variable in column 2 of the table
3. The result shows 
that we encounter the problem of estimating a (nearly) definitional relationship. The 
coefficients of output growth and hours per capita growth have the opposite sign and do not 
differ from each other significantly. The standard errors of these coefficients are extremely 
small and the explained variance is very high. Therefore, hours per capita cannot be taken 
into account as an explanatory variable in the Verdoorn equations.     
 
Labour market institutions are added in the third column of the table. Employment protection 
is not statistically significant. Unemployment compensation has a negative impact on 
productivity growth in contrast with what one would expect in case of a downward sloping 
labour demand curve. However, in the long run the result may be different as the stock of 
capital and the level of R&D are adapted to changes in labour supply. Wage coordination 
has a significant positive effect on productivity growth, presumably because it may facilitate 
macro-economic policy by promoting trust and consensus in the labour market.   
 
It may be argued that changes in institutions take time to make their effects come through. 
For this reason we introduce a one-period lag with respect to employment protection in the 
fourth column of Table 2. However, this effect is insignificant. Assuming that employment 
protection may have beneficial effects during the period of rapid catching-up (1960-1980) we 
also introduced an additional term
4. As seen from the table this additional effect is positive 
and clearly significant. It may therefore be concluded that protection of insiders in firms may 
be conducive to productivity growth in a period of technological progress characterized by 
imitation and incremental improvements. Once these possibilities are exhausted the negative 




                                                   
3 In Dew-Becker and Gordon (2008) employment per capita is used to explain productivity 
growth. However, changes in hours per capita may have a similar effect on the growth of 
productivity. 
4 Moreover, we considered a two-period lag and an extension of the first sub-period to 1985. The 
results in Table 2 appeared to be the most promising.   11 
The combined effect of human capital accumulation by insiders at the one hand and the 
need for labour market flexibility in a more competitive technological environment at the other 
hand is practically zero in the more recent period 1980-2005. It should be noted that the 
effects of the rate of investment and unemployment compensation now are insignificant. 
 
From the last column in Table 2, it can be seen that the introduction of fixed country effects 
(non-observed heterogeneity) does not change the statistical results substantially. Some 
regression coefficients change signs, but they are insignificant any way. Nevertheless, the 
result with respect to wage coordination is remarkable. This is not quite unexpected as 
labour market coordination typically differs across countries. Unions play different roles and 
cultural differences may have an influence on wage negotiations (cf. Hall and Soskice, 
2004). Fixed effects are labelled UFOs (unidentified fixed objects) by Allard and Lindert 
(2006).  
 
Looking behind the scene one may observe that fixed country effects are associated with 
some institutions such as wage coordination
5. As Allard and Lindert (2006, p. 22) note: “The 
durable effects of institutional packages are often captured in the fixed effects, and are quite 
different from the transitory coefficients that economists pursue and announce.” To see 
whether this is true we may look at the correlation between the mysterious UFOs and the 
country-average components of the institutional variables. Table 6 in the Appendix shows 
that employment protection, and to a lesser extent wage coordination, strongly correlate with 
fixed country effects. Transitory effects offset the impact of structural country effects to some 
extent, which is in line with the results found for EPL in the last column of Table 2. It may be 
concluded that in the case of applying Verdoorn‟s law the impact of labour market institutions 
on productivity growth remains somewhat obscure.  
                                                   
5 It should be noted that all the fixed country effects (not presented in the table) are positive, 
predominantly large, and with the exception of Australia, Canada, and New Zealand statistically 
significant.    12 
3.3 Catching-up and institutions 
 
As shown in Table 3 productivity growth can be explained to a large extent by the catching-
up of the OECD countries vis-à-vis the state of art in the US. The catching-up factor is 
defined as the log of the ratio of output per hour of a country and the level of this variable in 
the US at the beginning of every five-year period. Adding the growth rate of hours per capita 
as an additional explanatory variable in column 2 of the table shows that this variable has the 
expected sign and is highly significant. The introduction of labour market institutions gives 
the familiar picture, as seen from column 2 in Table 3. The variable for wage coordination is 
significant, whereas the variable for employment protection (EPL) does not seem relevant in 
explaining productivity growth. 
 
(Insert Table 3 about here) 
 
The more sophisticated two-period approach with respect to employment protection now 
generates interesting results. As shown in the fourth column of Table 3 the overall effect of 
protection is negative. The additional effect in the first sub-period is positive. The lagged 
employment protection variable is now also statistically significant. Combining these results it 
appears that the total effect of EPL in the sub-period 1960-1980 is strongly positive, whereas 
the total effect of EPL in the sub-period 1980-2005 is negative. In the catching-up model the 
protection of insiders goes at the expense of flexibility, which is not relevant in the first sub-
period. However, in the second sub-period labour market flexibility is a precondition for 
technological change.  Unemployment compensation and wage coordination have no 
statistically significant effect on productivity growth.  
 
Introduction of fixed country effects does not lead to different conclusions, although the 
combined effect of the EPL variable and its one period lagged counterpart is now marginally 
weaker. There is no significant correlation between the UFOs and the labour market 
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All fixed effects are negative and some of these effects are relatively large. This indicates 
that the catching-up process may be different according to specific conditions in the 
individual countries. Generalising, we may distinguish three groups of countries.  A first 
group reached the US productivity level around 1995. This group consists of Belgium, 
Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands and Norway. For this group the fixed country 
effects are small and statistically insignificant
6.  A second group combines countries that do 
relatively well, although catching-up is not complete. This group consists of Austria, Finland, 
Ireland, UK and Japan. The remaining countries belong to the group of laggards, but the 
reason for failure in terms of catching up may be different. Australia and New Zealand lie at 
the periphery of global economic activity. The international division of labour may place these 
countries in a special position. Other laggards include countries with a non-democratic past 
in certain periods like Greece, Spain and Portugal.  
 
The distinction between groups of countries raises the question about the deeper causes of 
non-observed heterogeneity. Possible explanations are democracy, governance and 
schooling, as inherited from the past. In his seminal book on social spending and economic 
growth since the eighteenth century Lindert (2004) elaborates on the hypothesis that more 
democratic societies led to higher school enrolments and therefore to more educated 
societies, which in turn is important for the development paths that countries followed.  As 
appears from Figure 2 the fixed country effects are positively correlated with the primary 
                                                   
6 For the other countries the fixed effects are statistically significant with the exception of Austria 
and Sweden.   14 
school enrolment rates in 1880
7. In the figure the fixed effects are augmented by the 
constant term of the equation (1.67), which implies that most country-specific constant terms 
are positive
8. All in all, it may be concluded that catching-up provides a satisfactory model to 
analyse the influence of institutions on labour productivity growth.   
 
(Insert Table 4 about here) 
 
In Table 4, the imputed effect of employment protection (EPL) on productivity growth is 
shown for a number of countries. The figures are based on the regression in column five of 
Table 3. In the first period EPL has a positive effect. The impact of EPL in the US and 
Canada is rather modest. However, in European countries the impact is noteworthy. In 
Germany and the Netherlands EPL contributes 0.5 percentage points to the growth of labour 
productivity. In Spain the contribution is almost 1.0 percentage point. These results are 
somewhat modest if seen in the context of the realized productivity increases.  
 
In the sub-period 1980-2005 EPL has a negative effect in all countries. The results are in the 
same order of magnitude, although lowest for the US. To give an impression of the 
contribution of EPL it can be deduced that without EPL German labour productivity growth 
would be 2.61 percent, which must be compared with the realized value of 2.26 percent. 
 
3.4. Combining the two engines of growth 
 
As seen from table 5 in the Appendix there is a strong correlation between both engines of 
growth, the growth of output (Verdoorn‟s law) and the productivity backlog (catching up). So 
combing both models might give collinearity problems. To investigate these we have added 
the catching-up factor to Verdoorn‟s law in the first column of Table 2. As can be seen from 
Table 8 in the Appendix the coefficients of both output growth and catching up have the right 
sign and are highly significant. This seems to indicate that multicollinearity is not a great 
problem in the combined model. However, the main problem with Verdoorn‟s model and 
mutatis mutandis with the combined model is that it is not possible to amend Verdoorn‟s law 
with the effects of labour force participation. This supports our conclusion that catching-up 
provides the most promising model to analyse the influence of institutions on labour 
productivity growth. 
                                                   
7 The enrolment rates are taken from Lindert (2004).  
8  Major exceptions are Portugal with low primary enrolment in 1880 and New Zealand with high 




The economic history of the US differs in a remarkable way from that of Europe. Two 
fundamental forces, i.e., output per hour and hours per capita drive the difference. Both 
economies have encountered a productivity slowdown. In the period 1960-2005 the US 
labour productivity growth is U-shaped, whereas the EU-15 growth rate shows a steady 
decline. The age of mass production in Europe proceeded quickly and efficiently when the 
peak in the US had already been reached. In the mid-1990s the process of catching-up of 
Europe vis-à-vis the US stopped. The US growth rate of welfare was not strongly affected by 
the productivity slowdown, because the participation rate was steadily rising. In Europe the 
participation rate declined until 1985 and only slightly increased on average afterwards. That 
is why the initial welfare backlog did not disappear despite the long period of catching up in 
terms of output per hour.  
 
Lower material welfare is not the only point that marks the distinction between Europe and 
the US. There are also important institutional differences especially in the labour market. The 
influence of institutions on productivity growth is analyzed by running regressions for a pool 
of 21 OECD countries over the period 1960-2005. The focus is on three labour market 
institutions, i.e., employment protection legislation, unemployment compensation and wage 
coordination. Productivity growth is driven by technological change, which in part is context 
specific and history dependent. Two engines of growth have been investigated, Verdoorn‟s 
law and the process of catching up. Applying Verdoorn‟s law does not lead to clear-cut 
conclusions with respect to the impact of labour market institutions on productivity growth. 
Moreover, the introduction of labour market participation as an additional explanatory 
variable does not fit into the Verdoorn equations. 
 
In the model with catching-up employment protection has a different impact before and after 
1980. In the first sub-period 1960-1980 technological imitation of the leader was substantial, 
and insiders were important in generating productivity growth. In the sub-period 1980-2005 
new initiatives with respect to the selection of products and production processes became 
more important.  Protection of insiders may then hamper flexibility and hence reduce 
productivity growth. The impact of unemployment compensation and that of wage 
coordination appear to be statistically insignificant. 
  
   16 
Table 2 Verdoorn‟s law and labour market institutions: regression of labour productivity 
growth on output growth and indices of institutional variables
a 
 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
           
Constant  -1.01  -0.31  -1.13  -0.29   0.90 
  (2.22)**  (1.92)**  (2.15)**  (0.54)  (1.35) 
           
Output growth   0.72   0.90   0.68   0.62   0.56 
  (12.4)***  (46.5)***  (10.7)***  (10.3)***  (9.50)*** 
           
Investment rate   0.07  -0.00   0.04   0.02  -0.03 
  (3.57)***  (0.11)  (2.02)**  (0.99)  (0.91) 
           
Employment protection       0.09   0.08  -0.42 
      (0.97)  (0.23)  (1.11) 
° Additional effect 1960-1980         0.52   0.46 
        (3.52)***  (2.51)** 
° One period lagged effect         -0.10  -0.24 
        (0.28)  (0.64) 
           
Unemployment compensation      -0.03  -0.02  -0.02 
      (2.61)***  (1.56)  (1.38) 
           
Wage coordination       0.48   0.31  -0.18 
      (3.00)***  (1.85)**  (0.81) 
           
Hours per capita (growth)    -1.03       
    (35.1)***       
           
Fixed country effects  No  No  No  No  Yes 
           
R squared adjusted
  0.55  0.94  0.58  0.62  0.71 
           
a) Number of observations: 189. White robust t-values between brackets: 
*** significant at the 99% confidence level, ** 95% level, * 90% level   17 
Table 3 Catching-up and labour market institutions: regression of labour productivity growth 
on productivity history and indices of institutional variables
a 
 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
            
Constant  -0.32   0.08   0.04   0.90   1.67 
  (0.66)  (0.18)  (0.08)  (1.79)*  (2.17)** 
           
Catching-up factor   -3.90  -3.54  -3.37  -3.06  -5.16 
  (11.6)***  (10.1)***  (9.02)***  (9.08)***  (8.27)*** 
           
Investment rate   0.08   0.06   0.04   0.02   0.01 
  (3.75)***  (3.25)***  (2.45)**  (1.21)  (0.30) 
           
Employment protection      -0.13  -0.98  -0.74 
      (1.44)  (3.76)***  (2.93)*** 
° Additional effect 1960-1980         0.63   0.36 
        (5.34)***  (2.90)*** 
° One period lagged effect         0.79   0.62 
        (3.06)***  (2.38)** 
           
Unemployment compensation      -0.01  -0.00   0.01 
      (0.83)  (0.17)  (0.39) 
           
Wage coordination       0.36   0.20   0.17 
      (2.30)**  (1.34)  (0.65) 
           
Hours per capita (growth)    -0.50  -0.48  -0.46  -0.30 
    (5.82)***  (5.50)***  (5.02)***  (3.67)*** 
           
Fixed country effects  No  No  No  No  Yes 
           
R squared adjusted
   0.53  0.62  0.63   0.67   0.76 
a) Number of observations: 189. White robust t-values between brackets: 
*** significant at the 99% confidence level, ** 95% level, * 90% level 
 
 
Table 4 Effect EPL on labour productivity growth for a selection of countries 
 
Period    US  Canada  Germany  Netherlands  Spain 
             
1960-1980  Growth rate   2.07   2.08   4.53   3.75   6.66 
  EPL   0.04   0.04   0.51   0.51   0.97 
1980-2005  Growth rate   1.71   1.37   2.26   1.81   1.74 
  EPL  -0.15  -0.36  -0.35  -0.48  -0.40 
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From the Total Economy Database of the Conference Board (2008): 
 
E: employment (persons engaged) 
H: hours (annual hours worked per employee) 
N: population (midyear) 
Y: output (total GDP, in 1990 US$ converted at Geary Khamis PPPs) 
Y/H: output per hour (labour productivity) 
Y/N: output per capita (material welfare) 
H/N: hours per capita (participation rate) 
 




From Allard and Lindert (2006): 
 
Unemployment compensation is the combination of three components into a single measure: 
-  the “replacement rate”, or (benefits per recipient) divided by market wage, net of taxes; 
-  the eligibility of the unemployed for benefits, including requirements for job search and 
sanctions for non-compliance set out in national law; 
-  the duration of coverage (6 months, 1 year, etc.). 
 
Wage coordination. Allard and Lindert use the time series on coordinated wage bargaining 
from Wolfgang Ochsel (2000), assuming no changes from 1999 onwards.  
 
Employment Protection Legislation. Detailed reading of legislation through history by Allard 
(2005) was codified into an index of EPL strictness dating back to 1950.  
 
Total data file Allard and Lindert: 
http://www.econ.ucdavis.edu/faculty/fzlinder/OECD_1950-2001_annual1.xls   21 
II Estimated Correlations 
 
Table 5 Variables in Tables 2 and 3* 
 
  Y/H  Y  CU  I/Y  EPL  UC  COOR  H/N 
Y/H   1               
Y   0.73   1             
CU  -0.71  -0.59   1           
I/Y   0.34   0.26  -0.23   1         
EPL  -0.12  -0.25   0.08  -0.07   1       
UC  -0.36  -0.35   0.42  -0.29   0.22   1     
COOR   0.27   0.14  -0.16   0.22   0.17   0.07   1   
H/N  -0.48   0.20   0.22  -0.16    0.02   0.14  -0.17  1 
                 
MEAN   2.99   3.34  -0.37  23.28   1.70  10.06   2.06  -0.30 
SD   1.93   1.85   0.33    4.51   1.09    8.26   0.65   1.23 
 
*Y/H = Productivity growth, Y = Output growth, CU = Catching-up factor, I/Y = 
Investment rate, EPL = Index employment protection, UC = Index unemployment 
compensation, COOR = Index wage coordination, H/N = Hours per capita (growth rate) 
 
Table 6: UFOs with institutional variables (Table 2, column 5) 
 
Employment protection   0.84 
Unemployment compensation   0.13 
Wage coordination   0.52 
 
 
Table 7: UFOs with institutional variables (Table 3, column 5) 
 
Employment protection  -0.14 
Unemployment compensation   0.04 
Wage coordination  -0.13 
 
Table 8: Combining the two engines of growth* 
 
Constant  -0.75 
  (1.78)* 
Output growth   0.47 
  (8.42)*** 
Catching-up factor  -2.40 
  (7.73)*** 
Investment rate   0.05 
  (3.19)*** 
   
R squared adjusted  0.66 
 
* By adding the catching-up factor to column 1 in Table 2. 